Lunit · arXiv:2608.15787, 2026
TL;DR. Two forward passes can share every MoE weight yet route the same token through different experts. We separate the resulting change into a pure routing term and a dense-like content term, then follow the routing term from block output to residual stream to behavior. Across seven checkpoints and two domains, raw routing magnitude varies much less than residual exposure; exposure is ordered by the routed block's share of the residual. Causal patches show that the routing term is real but bounded and largely reproduced by matched-norm noise. Router movement locates change. It does not establish behavioral influence.
Same-weight self-distillation creates an unusual comparison. A demonstration-conditioned teacher and a query-only student use the same parameters, but the added context changes hidden states and gates. The same token can therefore activate a different sparse computation in the two passes. A gate-overlap score can tell us that the route moved; it cannot tell us how much of the induced perturbation survives the rest of the network.
Same model weights, but a worked demonstration changes both hidden state and expert gates.
The comparison holds parameters fixed and replays matched token prefixes through both contexts.
The observed output difference combines changed gates and changed expert content.
The routed-output change admits an exact add-and-subtract decomposition. The first term changes gates while evaluating expert outputs at the student's hidden state. The second holds teacher gates fixed while changing expert content. This prevents a common attribution mistake: calling every teacher-student block difference a routing effect.
Switch between A and B to see what the decomposition holds fixed.
We measured seven open-weight MoE checkpoints on PubMedQA and GSM8K, with 200 matched prompts per domain. The architectures span top-2-of-8 to top-8-of-128 routing, shared and shared-free blocks, and multiple gate conventions. The normalized routing term occupies a relatively narrow observed range, but its exposure to the residual stream varies twice as widely in multiplicative terms.
The inversion is easiest to see at the extremes. Qwen3-30B uses the most fine-grained router and has one of the largest routing factors, yet the smallest residual exposure. OLMoE has a similar routing factor but the highest exposure. What differs is how much routed-block output contributes relative to the always-on residual backbone.
Correlation is not mechanism, so we scaled the always-on shared output in DeepSeek-V2-Lite and Gravity while leaving the router untouched. Reducing this backbone increased post-block exposure monotonically: from 0.0245 to 0.0395 in DeepSeek and from 0.0403 to 0.0769 in Gravity. A frozen-numerator dilution control stayed nearly flat.
The always-on path does more than enlarge the denominator after a perturbation forms. Preserved common-mode mass helps keep the teacher and student routes coherent, containing the mismatch before it propagates.
The decomposition and exposure screen still do not prove that the recorded routing term changes model behavior. In a preregistered three-model test, we patched the captured routing term into every MoE block and compared it with the natural context effect and matched-norm random directions.
The routing term has a real effect, but much of it is generic to perturbation magnitude. The content term tells a different story: its premium over a random direction is 5.6-80×, compared with 1.54-2.05× for the routing term on the same checkpoints and domain. Changed conditioning influences output primarily through direction-specific content, not through router movement alone.
Verify that the A/B decomposition exactly reconstructs the routed-output difference for the checkpoint and execution path.
Quantify the routing term relative to the residual stream instead of inferring influence from overlap or total variation.
When a downstream decision matters, patch the recorded term or run another behavioral intervention. Exposure is a screen, not a threshold.
Use router divergence to locate change, residual exposure to quantify propagation, and behavioral intervention to establish consequence.
The seven primary checkpoints are an opportunistic, family-correlated sample rather than a factorial architecture sweep. Backbone rescaling is confirmatory for two models, and behavioral patches cover three models and next-token effects rather than task-level generation quality. Scale probes and a merged-expert checkpoint show that the narrow block-level range is not universal. Most importantly, the claims concern one same-weight conditioning mismatch; they do not cover accumulated optimization, separately parameterized teachers, reinforcement-learning trajectories, or forgetting.
Interpretation boundary. Containment is not harmlessness. Exposure within the observed range is evidence about propagation in this regime, not a safety guarantee or a universal behavioral threshold.
@article{caruzzo2026routing,
title={Routing Divergence Is Not Evidence of Behavioral Influence in Same-Weight MoE Self-Distillation},
author={Caruzzo, Cedric and Yoo, Donggeun and Kim, Tae Soo},
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2608.15787},
year={2026}
}